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1. Introduction
1.1. The problem we solve
Booth and his co-authors have shown in a very interesting paper, see [2], that
many new approaches to theory revision (with ﬁxed K) can be represented
by two relations, < and  , where < is the usual ranked relation generated by
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AGM revision for ﬁxed K, and  is a sub-relation of <. They have, however,
left open a characterization of the inﬁnite case, which we treat here.
1.1.1. The framework
The background is AGM revision theory, see [1]. The basic problem of theory
revision is to “integrate” new information into old information, preserving
consistency. More precisely, both parts of information, taken separately, are
supposed to be consistent, but (in the interesting case) taking the union will
not do, as this union is inconsistent. AGM gave “rationality postulates” any
such integration should satisfy. The revision operator is usually written as
∗, so in the usual notation we revise information K with a new formula φ,
and the result is K ∗ φ. One of those postulates is, e.g., robustness under
reformulation: If φ and φ′ are (classically) equivalent, so are K∗φ and K∗φ′.
It was shown in [5] that a distance on the set of classical models gives a
semantics to AGM revision, similar to, but in one important point diﬀerent
from, the Stalnaker/Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals. When
K is ﬁxed, the AGM axioms are closely related to the axioms of rationality
in preferential structures, i.e., to a preference relation. In distance termi-
nology, we take the φ−models which are closest to the set of K−models.
In preference terminology, as K is ﬁxed, we take the “best” or “minimal”
φ−models.
It was the insight of Booth and co-authors that working with two rela-
tions, instead of just one preference relation, and leaving the set ofφ−models,
one can code many diﬀerent approaches to theory revision which go beyond
the AGM approach. The basic idea can perhaps best be described as follows:
In the general setting, the second relation is a subrelation of the ﬁrst, assume
now that they are identical. But we leave the set of φ−models. Consider
again the preference picture. We take now not only the “best” φ−models,
but also all those models (forcibly ¬φ−models) which are better than one
of the best φ−models. Diﬀerent subrelations have diﬀerent interpretations,
but this picture should suﬃce here. If ν(φ) is the function which chooses for
φ all those models we just described, then we can split ν in two, one part
µ+(φ), which chooses as usual the best φ−models, one part µ−(φ), which
chooses the ¬φ−models below the best φ−models. So µ+(φ) = ν(φ)∩M(φ),
and µ−(φ) = ν(φ)−M(φ).
The characterisation problem is now to give conditions for ν (or for µ+
and µ−) which hold for all such choice functions as described above, and
conversely, if they hold, then we can construct both relations, and ﬁnd again
the same choice functions by above deﬁnition.
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Booth et al. gave such a characterisation for the ﬁnite case. Charac-
terising ranked structures in the ﬁnite case is, in principle, easy, as we can
“grab” any single model by a formula. The inﬁnite case is similar, if we are
allowed to use full, perhaps inﬁnite, theories, i.e., sets of formulas. Again,
we can “grab” one model with a full theory. The more challenging case is
the inﬁnite version, when we are allowed to consider formulas only, as any
formula will (if consistent) always have an inﬁnity of models. So, if we want
to ﬁnd for x some y with x < y and some additional properties for y, we
have somehow to “circumscribe” y, without ever being allowed to use the full
information we need. This is the problem we solve in Section 4 (page 422).
We ﬁrst give there the conditions, formulate our main result, and turn to
the proof. The proof consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we construct the
ranked relation < . This is quite straightforward, using usual techniques of
constructing such a relation. The proof is also quite modular, e.g., we show
transitivity, absence of cycles, and then use a known lemma for the ﬁnal
construction. The more interesting and challenging part is to construct the
subrelation . It is there that we have to do with ﬁnite bits of information,
striving for a full characterisation of one model (for which we need an inﬁnite
amount of information). The trick is to construct the inﬁnite amount of
information using inductively a ﬁnite amount of information. (A picture
might illustrate this: we want to draw a 30 cm long straight line, but have
only a rule of length 20 cm. We draw ﬁrst 20 cm, then push the rule down,
and draw the last 10 cm, holding the rule against the ﬁrst part.) This part
of the proof is not very modular, and the interested reader will just have to
follow the line.
The, for us, main deﬁnition Booth et al. give is (in slight modiﬁcation,
we use the strict subrelations):
Definition 1.1. Given a deductively closed set of formulas K (as ususal in
AGM style revision, see [1]), and ≤ and , we deﬁne
K∞φ := Th({w : w  w′ for some w′ ∈ min(M(¬φ),≤)}),
i.e. K∞φ is given by all those worlds, which are below the K−closest
¬φ−worlds, as seen from K.
We want to characterize K∞φ, for ﬁxed K. Booth et al. have done the
ﬁnite case by working with complete consistent formulas, i.e. single models.
We want to do the inﬁnite case without using complete consistent theories,
i.e. in the usual style of completeness results in the area.
Our approach is basically semantic, though we use sometimes the lan-
guage of logic, on the one hand to show how to approximate with formulas
a single model, and on the other hand when we use classical compactness.
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This is, however, just a matter of speaking, and we could translate it into
model sets, too, but we do not think that we would win much by doing so.
Moreoever, we will treat only the formula case, as this seems to be the most
interesting (otherwise the problem of approximation by formulas would not
exist), and restrict ourselves to the deﬁnability preserving case. The more
general case is left open, for a young researcher who wants to sharpen his
tools by solving it. Another open problem is to treat the same question for
variable K, and for distance based revision.
1.2. Outline
After giving the framework of the article by Booth et al., we give background
information about preferential logic. We then state the conditions we need,
formulate our result (the extension to the inﬁnite case of the representation
result for the ﬁnite case stated in [2]), and proceed to the proof.
We introduce two functions µ+ and µ−, deﬁne a relation < and show
that it represents µ+, and then (the more diﬃcult part) deﬁne a relation ,
and show that it represents µ−.
We will work in propositional logic here, where the language can be
inﬁnite, i.e. where there may be inﬁnitely (also uncountably) many propo-
sitional variables.
2. The framework of [2]
For the reader’s convenience, and to put our work a bit more into perspective,
we repeat now some of the deﬁnitions and results given by Booth and his
co-authors. We will be very brief, and just prepare the terrain so to say.
Consequently, all material in this section is due to Booth and his co-
authors.
≤ will be a total pre-order, anchored on M(K), the models of K, i.e.
M(K) = min(W,≤), the set of ≤ −minimal worlds.
We have a second binary relation  on W, which is a reﬂexive subrelation
of ≤ .
Definition 2.1. (1) (≤,) is a K−context iﬀ ≤ is a total pre-order on W,
anchored on M(K), and  is a reﬂexive sub-relation of ≤ .
(2) K∞φ := Th({w : w  w′ for some w′ ∈ min(M(¬φ),≤)}) is called
a basic removal operator.
When we translate to model sets, or even generalize to arbitrary sets,
and reformulate a little, forgetting about the ﬁxed K, we can obtain:
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µ+(X) := {x ∈ X : x is ≤ −minimal in X}, and
µ−(X) := {y ∈ X : y  x for some x ∈ µ+(X)},
and separate the usual AGM operation, µ+(X), from the new part:
everything which is below µ+(X).
This is, roughly, the perspective from which we see the problem.
Theorem 2.1. (Note that Booth et al. impose that φ on the right of ∞ is
always consistent, so this caveat for some conditions in the AGM theory is
not necessary.)
Basic removal is characterized by:
(B1) K∞φ = Cn(K∞φ) - Cn classical consequence,
(B2) φ ∈ K∞φ,
(B3) If |= φ↔ φ′, then K∞φ = K∞φ′,
(B4) K∞⊥ = K,
(B5) K∞φ ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {¬φ}),
(B6) if σ ∈ K∞(σ ∧ φ), then σ ∈ K∞(σ ∧ φ ∧ ψ),
(B7) if σ ∈ K∞(σ ∧ φ), then K∞φ ⊆ K∞(σ ∧ φ),
(B8) (K∞σ) ∩ (K∞φ) ⊆ K∞(σ ∧ φ),
(B9) if φ ∈ K∞(σ ∧ φ), then K∞(σ ∧ φ) ⊆ K∞φ.
(B1) − (B3) belong to the basic AGM contraction postulates, (B4) −
(B5) are weakened versions of another basic AGM postulate:
(V acuity) If φ ∈ K, then K∞φ = K
which does not necessarily hold for basic removal operators.
The same holds for the remaining two basic AGM contraction postulates:
(Inclusion) K∞φ ⊆ K
(Recovery) K ⊆ Cn((K∞φ) ∪ {φ}).
The main deﬁnition towards the completeness result of Booth et al. is:
Definition 2.2. Given K and ∞, the structure C(K,∞) is deﬁned by:
(≤) w ≤ w′ iﬀ ¬α ∈ K∞(¬α ∧ ¬α′) and
() w  w′ iﬀ ¬α ∈ K∞¬α′,
where α is a formula which holds exactly in w, analogously for w′ and α′.
(Thus, α and α′ are equivalent to complete consistent theories, with
models w and w′. This is, of course, only possible in ﬁnite languages of
classical propositional languages, as we only have ﬁnite conjunctions at our
disposal. Herein lies the restriction.)
As it is easy to get confused here, we add a comment — where we take
liberties to make things intuitively clearer.
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Looking back at Deﬁnition 2.1 (page 406), we have
(≤) w ≤ w′ iﬀ w ∈ {v : v  v′ for some v′ ∈ min({w,w′},≤)}
and
() w  w′ iﬀ w ∈ {v : v  v′ for some v′ ∈ min({w′},≤)}
In our perspective, in the case (≤) we stay in X := {w,w′}, so we speak
about µ+(X), in the second case, we leave X := {w′}, so we speak about
µ−(X). So we have w ≤ w′ iﬀ w ∈ µ+({w,w′}), w  w′ iﬀ w ∈ µ−({w′}).
Booth et al. then give a long list of Theorems showing equivalence be-
tween various postulates, and conditions on the orderings ≤ and  . This,
of course, shows the power of their approach.
We give three examples:
Condition 2.1.
(c) If (for each i = 1, 2) wi ≤ w
′ for all w′, then w1  w2.
(d) If w1 ≤ w2 for all w2, then w1  w2 for all w2.
(e) If w1  w2, then w1 = w2 or w1 ≤ w
′ for all w′.
Theorem 2.2. Let ∞ be a basic removal operator as deﬁned above.
(1) ∞ satisﬁes one half of (V acuity) : If φ ∈ K, then K ⊆ K∞φ,
(2.1) If (≤,) satisﬁes (c), then ∞ satisﬁes (V acuity).
(2.2) If ∞ satisﬁes (V acuity), then C(K,∞) satisﬁes (c).
(3.1) If (≤,) satisﬁes (d), then ∞ satisﬁes (Inclusion).
(3.2) If ∞ satisﬁes (Inclusion), then C(K,∞) satisﬁes (d).
(4.1) If (≤,) satisﬁes (e), then ∞ satisﬁes (Recovery).
(4.2) If ∞ satisﬁes (Recovery), then C(K,∞) satisﬁes (e).
(5) The following are equivalent:
(5.1) ∞ is a full AGM contraction operator,
(5.2) ∞ satisﬁes (B1)− (B9), (Inclusion), and (Recovery)
(5.3) ∞ is generated by some (≤,) satisfying (d) and (e).
3. Background material
We give here some background material showing without proof connections
between conditions for preferential structures and an abstract result on or-
derings. Moreover, we give an introduction to AGM revision.
The material presented here goes beyond what is strictly needed, but
helps to put the question more into perspective.
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Definition 3.1.
(1) We use P to denote the power set operator, Π{Xi : i ∈ I} := {g :
g : I →
⋃
{Xi : i ∈ I}, ∀i ∈ I.g(i) ∈ Xi} is the general cartesian prod-
uct, card(X) shall denote the cardinality of X, and V the set-theoretic
universe we work in - the class of all sets. Given a set of pairs X , and a
set X, we denote by X  X := {〈x, i〉 ∈ X : x ∈ X}. When the context
is clear, we will sometime simply write X for X  X. (The intended use
is for preferential structures, where x will be a point (intention: a clas-
sical propositional model), and i an index, permitting copies of logically
identical points.)
(2) A ⊆ B will denote that A is a subset of B or equal to B, and A ⊂ B
that A is a proper subset of B, likewise for A ⊇ B and A ⊃ B.
Given some ﬁxed set U we work in, and X ⊆ U, then C(X) := U −X .
(3) If Y ⊆ P(X) for some X, we say that Y satisﬁes
(∩) iﬀ it is closed under ﬁnite intersections,
(
⋂
) iﬀ it is closed under arbitrary intersections,
(∪) iﬀ it is closed under ﬁnite unions,
(
⋃
) iﬀ it is closed under arbitrary unions,
(C) iﬀ it is closed under complementation,
(−) iﬀ it is closed under set diﬀerence.
(4) We will sometimes write A = B ‖ C for: A = B, or A = C, or A = B∪C.
We make ample and tacit use of the Axiom of Choice.
Definition 3.2.
(1) We work here in a classical propositional language L, a theory T will be
an arbitrary set of formulas. Formulas will often be named φ, ψ, etc.,
theories T, S, etc.
v(L) will be the set of propositional variables of L.
F (L) will be the set of formulas of L.
ML will be the set of (classical) models for L, M(T ) or MT is the set of
models of T, likewise M(φ) for a formula φ.
(2) DL := {M(T ) : T a theory in L}, the set of definable model sets.
Note that, in classical propositional logic, ∅,ML ∈ DL, DL contains
singletons, is closed under arbitrary intersections and ﬁnite unions.
An operation f : Y → P(ML) for Y ⊆ P(ML) is called definability
preserving , (dp) or (µdp) in short, iﬀ for all X ∈DL ∩ Y f(X) ∈DL.
We will also use (µdp) for binary functions f : Y × Y →→ P(ML) — as
needed for theory revision — with the the obvious meaning.
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(3)  will be classical derivability, and
T := {φ : T  φ}, the closure of T under  .
(4) Con(.) will stand for classical consistency, so Con(φ) will mean that
φ is classical consistent, likewise for Con(T ). Con(T, T ′) will stand for
Con(T ∪ T ′), etc.
(5) Given a consequence relation ∼| , we deﬁne
T := {φ : T ∼| φ}.
(There is no fear of confusion with T , as it just is not useful to close
twice under classical logic.)
(6) T ∨ T ′ := {φ ∨ φ′ : φ ∈ T, φ′ ∈ T ′}.
(7) If X ⊆ML, then Th(X) := {φ : X |= φ}, likewise for Th(m) , m ∈ML.
(|= will usually be classical validity.)
Explanation of Table 1 (page 417), “Logical rules, deﬁnitions and con-
nections Part I” and Table 2 (page 418), “Logical rules, deﬁnitions and
connections Part II”:
The tables are split in two, as they would not ﬁt onto a page otherwise.
The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two columns is that the ﬁrst column treats
the formula version of the rule, the second the more general theory (i.e., set
of formulas) version.
The numbers in the ﬁrst column “Corr.”, meaning “Correspondence”,
refer to Proposition 21 in [3]. The ﬁrst column “Corr.” is to be understood
as follows:
Let a logic ∼| satisfy (LLE) and (CCL), and deﬁne a function f :
DL → DL by f(M(T )) := M(T ). Then f is well deﬁned, satisﬁes (µdp),
and T = Th(f(M(T ))).
If ∼| satisﬁes a rule in the left hand side, then - provided the additional
properties noted in the middle for ⇒ hold, too - f will satisfy the property
in the right hand side.
Conversely, if f : Y → P(ML) is a function, with DL ⊆ Y, and we deﬁne
a logic ∼| by T := Th(f(M(T ))), then ∼| satisﬁes (LLE) and (CCL). If f
satisﬁes (µdp), then f(M(T )) = M(T ).
If f satisﬁes a property in the right hand side, then - provided the ad-
ditional properties noted in the middle for ⇐ hold, too - ∼| will satisfy the
property in the left hand side.
We use the following abbreviations for those supplementary conditions in
the “Correspondence” columns: “T = φ” means that, if one of the theories
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(the one named the same way) is equivalent to a formula, we do not need
(µdp). −(µdp) stands for “without (µdp)”.
A = B ‖ C will abbreviate A = B, or A = C, or A = B ∪ C.
The numbers in the left hand column of the following Fact 3.1 (page 411)
refer to the proof of Fact 3.6 in [3].
Fact 3.1. Table 3 (page 419), “Interdependencies of algebraic rules”, is to be
read as follows: If the left hand side holds for some function f : Y → P(U),
and the auxiliary properties noted in the middle also hold for f or Y, then
the right hand side will hold, too — and conversely.
“sing.” will stand for: “Y contains singletons”
Definition 3.3. Fix U = ∅, and consider arbitrary X. Note that this X
has not necessarily anything to do with U, or U below. Thus, the functions
µM below are in principle functions from V to V — where V is the set
theoretical universe we work in.
Note that we work here often with copies of elements (or models). In
other areas of logic, most authors work with valuation functions. Both
deﬁnitions — copies or valuation functions — are equivalent, a copy 〈x, i〉
can be seen as a state 〈x, i〉 with valuation x. In the beginning of research on
preferential structures, the notion of copies was widely used, whereas e.g.,
[4] used that of valuation functions. There is perhaps a weak justiﬁcation
of the former terminology. In modal logic, even if two states have the same
valid classical formulas, they might still be distinguishable by their valid
modal formulas. But this depends on the fact that modality is in the object
language. In most work on preferential structures, the consequence relation
is outside the object language, so diﬀerent states with same valuation are in
a stronger sense copies of each other.
(1) Preferential models or structures.
(1.1) The version without copies:
A pair M := 〈U,≺〉 with U an arbitrary set, and ≺ an arbitrary
binary relation on U is called a preferential model or structure.
(1.2) The version with copies :
A pair M := 〈U ,≺〉 with U an arbitrary set of pairs, and ≺ an
arbitrary binary relation on U is called a preferential model or
structure.
If 〈x, i〉 ∈ U , then x is intended to be an element of U, and i the index
of the copy.
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We sometimes also need copies of the relation ≺ . We will then replace
≺ by one or several arrows α attacking non-minimal elements, e.g.,
x ≺ y will be written α : x → y , 〈x, i〉 ≺ 〈y, i〉 will be written
α : 〈x, i〉 → 〈y, i〉 , and ﬁnally we might have 〈α, k〉 : x → y and
〈α, k〉 : 〈x, i〉 → 〈y, i〉 , etc.
(2) Minimal elements, the functions µM
(2.1) The version without copies:
Let M := 〈U,≺〉, and deﬁne
µM(X) := {x ∈ X : x ∈ U ∧ ¬∃x
′ ∈ X ∩ U.x′ ≺ x}.
µM(X) is called the set of minimal elements of X (in M).
Thus, µM(X) is the set of elements such that there is no smaller one
in X.
(2.2) The version with copies:
Let M := 〈U ,≺〉 be as above. Deﬁne
µM(X) := {x ∈ X : ∃〈x, i〉 ∈ U .¬∃〈x
′, i′〉 ∈ U(x′ ∈ X ∧ 〈x′, i′〉′ ≺
〈x, i〉)}.
Thus, µM(X) is the projection on the ﬁrst coordinate of the set of
elements such that there is no smaller one in X.
Again, by abuse of language, we say that µM(X) is the set of mini-
mal elements of X in the structure. If the context is clear, we will
also write just µ.
We sometimes say that 〈x, i〉 “kills” or “minimizes” 〈y, j〉 if 〈x, i〉 ≺
〈y, j〉. By abuse of language we also say a set X kills or minimizes
a set Y if for all 〈y, j〉 ∈ U , y ∈ Y there is 〈x, i〉 ∈ U , x ∈ X s.t.
〈x, i〉 ≺ 〈y, j〉.
M is also called injective or 1-copy , iﬀ there is always at most one
copy 〈x, i〉 for each x. Note that the existence of copies corresponds
to a non-injective labelling function — as is often used in nonclassical
logic, e.g., modal logic.
We say that M is transitive, irref lexive, etc., iﬀ ≺ is.
Note that µ(X) might well be empty, even if X is not.
Usually, preferential structures work with copies of models (or, equiv-
alently, with function which attribute values to points, as, e.g., in Kripke
structures for modal logics). Ranked structures (usually) do not need copies.
For completeness’ sake, we gave the full deﬁnition, though it will not be used
here. For more details, the reader is referred to [7] or [3].
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Definition 3.4. We deﬁne the consequence relation of a preferential struc-
ture for a given propositional language L.
(1)(1.1) If m is a classical model of a language L, we say by abuse of language
〈m, i〉 |= φ iﬀ m |= φ,
and if X is any set of such pairs, that
X |= φ iﬀ for all 〈m, i〉 ∈ X m |= φ.
(1.2) If M is a preferential structure, and X is a set of L−models for a
classical propositional language L, or a set of pairs 〈m, i〉, where the
m are such models, we call M a classical preferential structure or
model.
(2) V alidity in a preferential structure, or the semantical consequence
relation deﬁned by such a structure:
Let M be as above.
We deﬁne:
T |=M φ iﬀ µM(M(T )) |= φ, i.e., µM(M(T )) ⊆M(φ).
(3) M will be called definability preserving iﬀ for all X ∈ DL µM(X) ∈
DL.
As µM is deﬁned on DL, but need by no means always result in some
new deﬁnable set, this is (and reveals itself as a quite strong) additional
property.
(Note that the X in above deﬁnition is any set, intuitively x ∈ Y, where
Y is some set of sets as in Deﬁnition 3.3 (page 411).)
Definition 3.5. Let Y ⊆ P(U). (In applications to logic, Y will be DL.)
A preferential structureM is called Y−smooth iﬀ for every X ∈ Y every
element x ∈ X is either minimal in X or above an element, which is minimal
in X. More precisely:
(1) The version without copies:
If x ∈ X ∈ Y, then either x ∈ µ(X) or there is x′ ∈ µ(X).x′ ≺ x.
(2) The version with copies:
If x ∈ X ∈ Y, and 〈x, i〉 ∈ U , then either there is no 〈x′, i′〉 ∈ U , x′ ∈ X,
〈x′, i′〉 ≺ 〈x, i〉 or there is 〈x′, i′〉 ∈ U , 〈x′, i′〉 ≺ 〈x, i〉, x′ ∈ X, s.t. there
is no 〈x′′, i′′〉 ∈ U , x′′ ∈ X, with 〈x′′, i′′〉 ≺ 〈x′, i′〉.
(Writing down all details here again might make it easier to read appli-
cations of the deﬁnition later on.)
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When considering the models of a language L, M will be called smooth
iﬀ it is DL−smooth ; DL is the default.
Obviously, the richer the set Y is, the stronger the condition Y−smooth-
ness will be.
Fact 3.2. Let ≺ be an irreﬂexive, binary relation on X, then the following
two conditions are equivalent:
(1) There is Ω and an irreﬂexive, total, binary relation ≺′ on Ω and a
function f : X → Ω s.t. x ≺ y ⇔ f(x) ≺′ f(y) for all x, y ∈ X.
(2) Let x, y, z ∈ X and x⊥y wrt. ≺ (i.e., neither x ≺ y nor y ≺ x), then
z ≺ x ⇒ z ≺ y and x ≺ z ⇒ y ≺ z.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Let x⊥y, thus neither f(x) ≺′ f(y) nor f(y) ≺′ f(x),
but then f(x) = f(y). Let now z ≺ x, so f(z) ≺′ f(x) = f(y), so z ≺ y.
x ≺ z ⇒ y ≺ z is similar.
(2)⇒ (1): For x ∈ X let [x] := {x′ ∈ X : x⊥x′}, and Ω := {[x] : x ∈ X}.
For [x], [y] ∈ Ω let [x] ≺′ [y] :⇔ x ≺ y. This is well-deﬁned: Let x⊥x′, y⊥y′
and x ≺ y, then x ≺ y′ and x′ ≺ y′. Obviously, ≺′ is an irreﬂexive, total
binary relation. Deﬁne f : X → Ω by f(x) := [x], then x ≺ y ⇔ [x] ≺′ [y]⇔
f(x) ≺′ f(y).
Definition 3.6. We call an irreﬂexive, binary relation ≺ on X, which sat-
isﬁes (1) (equivalently (2)) of Fact 3.2 (page 414), ranked. By abuse of
language, we also call a preferential structure 〈X,≺〉 ranked, iﬀ ≺ is.
Fact 3.3. If ≺ on X is ranked, and free of cycles, then ≺ is transitive.
Proof. Let x ≺ y ≺ z. If x⊥z, then y  z, resulting in a cycle of length 2.
If z ≺ x, then we have a cycle of length 3. So x ≺ z.
We give a generalized abstract nonsense result, taken from [5], which
must be part of the folklore:
Lemma 3.4. Given a set X and a binary relation R on X, there exists a total
preorder (i.e., a total, reﬂexive, transitive relation) S on X that extends R
such that
∀x, y ∈ X(xSy, ySx ⇒ xR∗y)
where R∗ is the reﬂexive and transitive closure of R.
Proof. Deﬁne x ≡ y iﬀ xR∗y and yR∗x. The relation ≡ is an equivalence
relation. Let [x] be the equivalence class of x under ≡ . Deﬁne [x]  [y] iﬀ
xR∗y. The deﬁnition of  does not depend on the representatives x and y
chosen. The relation  on equivalence classes is a partial order. Let ≤ be
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any total order on these equivalence classes that extends  . Deﬁne xSy iﬀ
[x] ≤ [y]. The relation S is total (since ≤ is total) and transitive (since ≤ is
transitive) and is therefore a total preorder. It extends R by the deﬁnition
of  and the fact that ≤ extends  . Suppose now xSy and ySx. We have
[x] ≤ [y] and [y] ≤ [x] and therefore [x] = [y] by antisymmetry. Therefore
x ≡ y and xR∗y.
To put AGM revision into context, we cite the main deﬁnitions and
results, essentially from [1].
Definition 3.7. We present in parallel the logical and the semantic (or
purely algebraic) side. For the latter, we work in some ﬁxed universe U,
and the intuition is U = ML, X = M(K), etc., so, e.g., A ∈ K becomes
X ⊆ B, etc.
(For reasons of readability, we omit most caveats about deﬁnability.)
K⊥ will denote the inconsistent theory.
We consider two functions, - and ∗, taking a deductively closed theory
and a formula as arguments, and returning a (deductively closed) theory on
the logics side. The algebraic counterparts work on deﬁnable model sets.
It is obvious that (K − 1), (K ∗ 1), (K − 6), (K ∗ 6) have vacuously true
counterparts on the semantical side. Note that K (X) will never change,
everything is relative to ﬁxed K (X). K ∗φ is the result of revising K with φ.
K − φ is the result of subtracting enough from K to be able to add ¬φ in a
reasonable way, called contraction.
Moreover, let ≤K be a relation on the formulas relative to a deductively
closed theory K on the formulas of L, and ≤X a relation on P(U) or a
suitable subset of P(U) relative to ﬁxed X. When the context is clear, we
simply write ≤ . ≤K (≤X) is called a relation of epistemic entrenchment for
K (X).
Table 4 (page 420), “AGM theory revision”, presents “rationality postu-
lates” for contraction (-), rationality postulates revision (∗) and epistemic
entrenchment. In AGM tradition, K will be a deductively closed theory,
φ,ψ formulas. Accordingly, X will be the set of models of a theory, A,B the
model sets of formulas.
In the further development, formulas φ etc. may sometimes also be
full theories. As the transcription to this case is evident, we will not go
into details.
Definition 3.8. We deﬁne the collective and the individual variant of choos-
ing the closest elements in the second operand by two operators, |, ↑: P(U)×
P(U)→ P(U) :
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Let d be a distance or pseudo-distance.
X | Y := {y ∈ Y : ∃xy ∈ X.∀x
′ ∈ X,∀y′ ∈ Y (d(xy, y) ≤ d(x
′, y′)}
(the collective variant, used in theory revision)
and
X ↑ Y := {y ∈ Y : ∃xy ∈ X.∀y
′ ∈ Y (d(xy , y) ≤ d(xy, y
′)}
(the individual variant, used for counterfactual conditionals and theory
update).
Thus, A |d B is the subset of B consisting of all b ∈ B that are closest
to A. Note that, if A or B is inﬁnite, A |d B may be empty, even if A and
B are not empty. A condition assuring nonemptiness will be imposed when
necessary.
Remark 3.5.
(1) Note that (X | 7) and (X | 8) express a central condition for ranked
structures: If we note X | . by fX(.), we then have: fX(A) ∩ B = ∅ ⇒
fX(A ∩B) = fX(A) ∩B.
(2) It is trivial to see that AGM revision cannot be deﬁned by an indi-
vidual distance (see Deﬁnition 3.8 (page 415)): Suppose X | Y := {y ∈ Y :
∃xy ∈ X(∀y
′ ∈ Y.d(xy, y) ≤ d(xy, y
′))}. Consider a, b, c. {a, b} | {b, c} = {b}
by (X | 3) and (X | 4), so d(a, b) < d(a, c). But on the other hand
{a, c} | {b, c} = {c}, so d(a, b) > d(a, c), contradiction.
Proposition 3.6. We refer here to Table 5 (page 421), “AGM interdeﬁn-
ability”. Contraction, revision, and epistemic entrenchment are interdeﬁn-
able by the following equations, i.e., if the deﬁning side has the respective
properties, so will the deﬁned side. (See [1].)
Speaking in terms of distance deﬁned revision, X | A is the set of those
a ∈ A, which are closest to X, and X !A is the set of y which are either in
X, or in C(A) and closest to X among those in C(A).
The reader is referred to [1] for more explanation and motivation.
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Table 1. Logical rules, deﬁnitions and connections Part I
Logical rules, deﬁnitions and connections Part I
Logical rule Corr. Model set
Basics
(SC) Supraclassicality (SC) ⇒ (4.1) (µ ⊆)
α  β ⇒ α ∼| β T ⊆ T ⇐ (4.2) f(X) ⊆ X
(REF ) Reﬂexivity
T ∪ {α} ∼| α
(LLE) (LLE)
Left Logical Equivalence
 α ↔ α′, α ∼| β ⇒ T = T ′ ⇒ T = T ′
α′ ∼| β
(RW ) Right Weakening (RW )
α ∼| β, β → β′ ⇒ T ∼| β, β → β′ ⇒
α ∼| β′ T ∼| β′
(wOR) (wOR) ⇒ (3.1) (µwOR)
α ∼| β, α′  β ⇒ T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ ⇐ (3.2) f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ Y
α ∨ α′ ∼| β
(disjOR) (disjOR) ⇒ (2.1) (µdisjOR)
α  ¬α′, α ∼| β, ¬Con(T ∪ T ′) ⇒ ⇐ (2.2) X ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒
α′ ∼| β ⇒ α ∨ α′ ∼| β T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ f(Y )
(CP ) (CP ) ⇒ (5.1) (µ∅)
Consistency Preservation ⇐ (5.2)
α ∼| ⊥ ⇒ α  ⊥ T ∼| ⊥ ⇒ T  ⊥ f(X) = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅
(µ∅fin)
X = ∅ ⇒ f(X) = ∅
for ﬁnite X
(AND1)
α ∼| β ⇒ α ∼| ¬β
(ANDn)
α ∼| β1, . . . , α ∼| βn−1 ⇒
α ∼| (¬β1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬βn−1)
(AND) (AND)
α ∼| β,α ∼| β′ ⇒ T ∼| β, T ∼| β′ ⇒
α ∼| β ∧ β′ T ∼| β ∧ β′
(CCL) Classical Closure (CCL)
T classically closed
(OR) (OR) ⇒ (1.1) (µOR)
α ∼| β,α′ ∼| β ⇒ T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ ⇐ (1.2) f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ f(Y )
α ∨ α′ ∼| β
(PR) ⇒ (6.1) (µPR)
α ∧ α′ ⊆ α ∪ {α′} T ∪ T ′ ⊆ T ∪ T ′ ⇐ (µdp) + (µ ⊆) (6.2) X ⊆ Y ⇒
⇐ −(µdp) (6.3) f(Y ) ∩X ⊆ f(X)
⇐ (µ ⊆) (6.4)
T ′ = φ
⇐ (6.5) (µPR′)
T ′ = φ f(X) ∩ Y ⊆ f(X ∩ Y )
(CUT ) (CUT ) ⇒ (7.1) (µCUT )
T ∼| α; T ∪ {α} ∼| β ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ ⇐ (7.2) f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
T ∼| β T ′ ⊆ T f(X) ⊆ f(Y )
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Table 2. Logical rules, deﬁnitions and connections Part II
Logical rules, deﬁnitions and connections Part II
Logical rule Corr. Model set
Cumulativity
(wCM)
α ∼| β, α′  α, α ∧ β  α′ ⇒
α′ ∼| β
(CM2)
α ∼| β, α ∼| β′ ⇒ α∧β  ¬β′
(CMn)
α ∼| β1, . . . , α ∼| βn ⇒
α ∧ β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βn−1  ¬βn
(CM) Cautious Monotony (CM) ⇒ (8.1) (µCM)
α ∼| β, α ∼| β′ ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ ⇐ (8.2) f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
α ∧ β ∼| β′ T ⊆ T ′ f(Y ) ⊆ f(X)
or (ResM) Restricted
Monotony
⇒ (9.1) (µResM)
T ∼| α, β ⇒ T ∪ {α} ∼| β ⇐ (9.2) f(X) ⊆ A ∩ B ⇒
f(X ∩A) ⊆ B
(CUM) Cumulativity (CUM) ⇒ (11.1) (µCUM)
α ∼| β ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ ⇐ (11.2) f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
(α ∼| β′ ⇔ α ∧ β ∼| β′) T = T ′ f(Y ) = f(X)
(⊆⊇) ⇒ (10.1) (µ ⊆⊇)
T ⊆ T ′, T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ ⇐ (10.2) f(X) ⊆ Y, f(Y ) ⊆ X ⇒
T ′ = T f(X) = f(Y )
Rationality
(RatM) Rational Monotony (RatM) ⇒ (12.1) (µRatM)
α ∼| β, α ∼| ¬β′ ⇒ Con(T ∪ T ′), T  T ′ ⇒ ⇐ (µdp) (12.2) X ⊆ Y, X ∩ f(Y ) = ∅ ⇒
α ∧ β′ ∼| β T ⊇ T ′ ∪ T ⇐ −(µdp) (12.3) f(X) ⊆ f(Y ) ∩X
⇐ T = φ (12.4)
(RatM =) ⇒ (13.1) (µ =)
Con(T ∪ T ′), T  T ′ ⇒ ⇐ (µdp) (13.2) X ⊆ Y, X ∩ f(Y ) = ∅ ⇒
T = T ′ ∪ T ⇐ −(µdp) (13.3) f(X) = f(Y ) ∩X
⇐ T = φ (13.4)
(Log =′) ⇒ (14.1) (µ =′)
Con(T ′ ∪ T ) ⇒ ⇐ (µdp) (14.2) f(Y ) ∩X = ∅ ⇒
T ∪ T ′ = T ′ ∪ T ⇐ −(µdp) (14.3) f(Y ∩X) = f(Y ) ∩X
⇐ T = φ (14.4)
(DR) (Log ‖) ⇒ (15.1) (µ ‖)
α ∨ β ∼| γ ⇒ T ∨ T ′ is one of ⇐ (15.2) f(X ∪ Y ) is one of
α ∼| γ or β ∼| γ T, or T ′, or T ∩T ′ (by (CCL)) f(X), f(Y ) or f(X)∪f(Y )
(Log∪) ⇒ (µ ⊆) + (µ =) (16.1) (µ∪)
Con(T ′ ∪T ), ¬Con(T ′ ∪T ) ⇒⇐ (µdp) (16.2) f(Y ) ∩ (X − f(X)) = ∅ ⇒
¬Con(T ∨ T ′ ∪ T ′) ⇐ −(µdp) (16.3) f(X ∪ Y ) ∩ Y = ∅
(Log∪′) ⇒ (µ ⊆) + (µ =) (17.1) (µ∪′)
Con(T ′ ∪T ), ¬Con(T ′ ∪T ) ⇒⇐ (µdp) (17.2) f(Y ) ∩ (X − f(X)) = ∅ ⇒
T ∨ T ′ = T ⇐ −(µdp) (17.3) f(X ∪ Y ) = f(X)
(µ ∈)
a ∈ X − f(X) ⇒
∃b ∈ X.a ∈ f({a, b})
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Table 3. Interdependencies of algebraic rules
.
Interdependencies of algebraic rules
Basics
(1.1) (µPR) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µPR′)
(1.2) ⇐
(2.1) (µPR) ⇒ (µ ⊆) (µOR)
(2.2) ⇐ (µ ⊆) + (−)
(2.3) ⇒ (µ ⊆) (µwOR)
(2.4) ⇐ (µ ⊆) + (−)
(3) (µPR) ⇒ (µCUT )
(4) (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇) + (µCUM) 	⇒ (µPR)
+(µRatM) + (∩)
Cumulativity
(5.1) (µCM) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µResM)
(5.2) ⇐ (inﬁn.)
(6) (µCM) + (µCUT ) ⇔ (µCUM)
(7) (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇) ⇒ (µCUM)
(8) (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) + (∩) ⇒ (µ ⊆⊇)
(9) (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) 	⇒ (µ ⊆⊇)
Rationality
(10) (µRatM) + (µPR) ⇒ (µ =)
(11) (µ =) ⇒ (µPR) + (µRatM)
(12.1) (µ =) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µ =′)
(12.2) ⇐
(13) (µ ⊆) + (µ =) ⇒ (∪) (µ∪)
(14) (µ ⊆) + (µ∅) + (µ =) ⇒ (∪) (µ ‖), (µ∪′), (µCUM)
(15) (µ ⊆) + (µ ‖) ⇒ (−) of Y (µ =)
(16) (µ ‖) + (µ ∈) + (µPR)+ ⇒ (∪) + sing. (µ =)
(µ ⊆)
(17) (µCUM) + (µ =) ⇒ (∪) + sing. (µ ∈)
(18) (µCUM) + (µ =) + (µ ⊆) ⇒ (∪) (µ ‖)
(19) (µPR) + (µCUM) + (µ ‖) ⇒ suﬃcient, (µ =).
e.g., true in DL
(20) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ =) 	⇒ (µ ‖)
(21) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ ‖) 	⇒ (without (−)) (µ =)
(22) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ ‖)+ 	⇒ (µ ∈)
(µ =) + (µ∪) (thus not
representable by
ranked structures)
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Table 4. AGM theory revision
AGM theory revision
Contraction, K − φ
(K − 1) K − φ is deductively closed
(K − 2) K − φ ⊆ K (X  2) X ⊆ X  A
(K − 3) φ 	∈ K ⇒ K − φ = K (X  3) X 	⊆ A ⇒ X A = X
(K − 4) 	 φ ⇒ φ 	∈ K − φ (X  4) A 	= U ⇒ X A 	⊆ A
(K − 5) K ⊆ (K − φ) ∪ {φ} (X  5) (X  A) ∩ A ⊆ X
(K − 6)  φ ↔ ψ ⇒ K − φ = K − ψ
(K − 7) (K − φ) ∩ (K − ψ) ⊆ (X  7) X  (A ∩ B) ⊆
K − (φ ∧ ψ) (X A) ∪ (X  B)
(K − 8) φ 	∈ K − (φ ∧ ψ) ⇒ (X  8) X  (A ∩B) 	⊆ A ⇒
K − (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ K − φ X  A ⊆ X  (A ∩ B)
Revision, K ∗ φ
(K ∗ 1) K ∗ φ is deductively closed -
(K ∗ 2) φ ∈ K ∗ φ (X | 2) X | A ⊆ A
(K ∗ 3) K ∗ φ ⊆ K ∪ {φ} (X | 3) X ∩ A ⊆ X | A
(K ∗ 4) ¬φ 	∈ K ⇒ (X | 4) X ∩A 	= ∅ ⇒
K ∪ {φ} ⊆ K ∗ φ X | A ⊆ X ∩ A
(K ∗ 5) K ∗ φ = K⊥ ⇒  ¬φ (X | 5) X | A = ∅ ⇒ A = ∅
(K ∗ 6)  φ ↔ ψ ⇒ K ∗ φ = K ∗ ψ -
(K ∗ 7) K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (X | 7) (X | A) ∩B ⊆
(K ∗ φ) ∪ {ψ} X | (A ∩ B)
(K ∗ 8) ¬ψ 	∈ K ∗ φ ⇒ (X | 8) (X | A) ∩ B 	= ∅ ⇒
(K ∗ φ) ∪ {ψ} ⊆ K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) X | (A ∩ B) ⊆ (X | A) ∩ B
Epistemic entrenchment
(EE1) ≤K is transitive (EE1) ≤X is transitive
(EE2) φ  ψ ⇒ φ ≤K ψ (EE2) A ⊆ B ⇒ A ≤X B
(EE3) ∀φ, ψ (EE3) ∀A,B
(φ ≤K φ ∧ ψ or ψ ≤K φ ∧ ψ) (A ≤X A ∩B or B ≤X A ∩ B)
(EE4) K 	= K⊥ ⇒ (EE4) X 	= ∅ ⇒
(φ 	∈ K iﬀ ∀ψ.φ ≤K ψ) (X 	⊆ A iﬀ ∀B.A ≤X B)
(EE5) ∀ψ.ψ ≤K φ ⇒ φ (EE5) ∀B.B ≤X A ⇒ A = U
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Table 5. AGM interdeﬁnability
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4. Construction and Proof
We change perspective a little, and work directly with a ranked relation, so
we forget about the (ﬁxed) K of revision, and have an equivalent, ranked
structure. (This result is part of the folklore: for ﬁxed K, AGM axioms
describe a ranked relation on the set of all models, where model of K are
at the bottom, see above.) We are then interested in an operator ν, which
returns a model set ν(M(φ)), written sloppily ν(φ), where ν(φ) ∩M(φ) is
given by a ranked relation <, and ν(φ) − M(φ) := {x ∈ M(φ) : ∃y ∈
ν(φ) ∩M(φ)(x  y)}, and  is an arbitrary subrelation of < .
The essential problem is to ﬁnd such y, as we have only formulas to ﬁnd it.
In the ﬁnite case, every model can be described by a formula, i.e., there is a
formula which holds in this model, and nowhere else. In the inﬁnite case, we
need a full theory to do this. Our aim is, however, to achieve characterization
with rules about formulas. So we have to take a more careful approach. But
this is also the challenge which makes the problem interesting. (If we had
full theories, we could just look at all Th({y}) whether x ∈ ν(Th({y})),
where x, y are models.)
There is still some more work to do, as we have to connect the two
relations, and simply taking a ready representation result will not do, as we
shall see.
We ﬁrst introduce some notation, then a set of conditions, and formulate
the representation result. Soundness will be trivial. For completeness, we
construct ﬁrst the ranked relation <, show that it does what it should do,
and then the subrelation .
Note that, contrary to Booth et al., we work here with the strict part
of the relations. This is a slight restriction, but our main interest was to
deal with an inﬁnite case by ﬁnite means. So, for what we want to do, it is
perhaps not so important.
Notation 4.1.
We set
µ+(X) := ν(X) ∩X
µ−(X) := ν(X)−X
where X := M(φ) for some φ.
Recall that, intuitively, µ+(X) is the set of < −minimal elements of
X, and µ−(X) = {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ µ+(X)(x  y)}, where  is an arbitrary
subrelation of < .
So, µ−(X) is, roughly, everything which is underneath some minimal
element of X. This motivates the properties of µ− to be deﬁned now.
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Condition 4.1.
(µ−1) Y ∩ µ−(X) = ∅ ⇒ µ+(Y ) ∩X = ∅
(µ−2) Y ∩ µ−(X) = ∅ ⇒ µ+(X ∪ Y ) = µ+(Y )
(µ−3) Y ∩ µ−(X) = ∅ ⇒ µ−(Y ) ∩X = ∅
(µ−4) µ+(A) ⊆ µ+(B) ⇒ µ−(A) ⊆ µ−(B)
(µ−5) µ+(X ∪ Y ) = µ+(X) ∪ µ+(Y ) ⇒ µ−(X ∪ Y ) = µ−(X) ∪ µ−(Y )
(µ−1) says that if there is y ∈ Y which is below X, then no minimal
element of Y can be in X, and (µ−2) says that in this case the minimal
elements of X ∪ Y have to be exactly the minimal elements of Y. But then
also what is below Y, cannot be in X, (µ−3). These conditions exclude cycles.
(µ−4) and (µ−5) are consequences of the existential quantiﬁer in the
intuitive meaning of µ−.
Many of the axioms characterizing basic removal in Theorem 2.1 (page
407) are about rankedness, and thus closely follow AGM tradition, we will
put them into conditions about µ+, where we speak about rankedness. On
the other hand, our axioms (µ−i) either exclude cycles, or treat the existen-
tial quantiﬁer. So Booth’s and our own sets of axioms don’t have very much
in common — directly, of course.
Recall for the following conditions (µ∅), (µ ⊆), (µ =) deﬁned in Table 1
(page 417), and in Table 2 (page 418) which we repeat here for the reader’s
convenience:
(µ∅) X = ∅ → µ(X) = ∅
(µ ⊆) µ(X) ⊆ X
(µ =) X ⊆ Y, µ(Y ) ∩X = ∅ ⇒ µ(X) = µ(Y ) ∩X.
Fact 4.1. (µ−1) and (µ∅), (µ ⊆) for µ+ imply
(1) µ+(X) ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒ µ+(X) ∩ µ−(Y ) = ∅
(2) X ∩ µ−(X) = ∅.
Proof. (1) Let µ+(X) ∩ µ−(Y ) = ∅, then X ∩ µ−(Y ) = ∅, so by (µ−1)
µ+(X) ∩ Y = ∅.
(2) Set X := Y, and use (µ∅), (µ ⊆), (µ−1).
Fact 4.2. Let the following conditions (µ ⊆), (µ∅), (µ =) for µ+, and (µ−1)−
(µ−5) hold for µ+ and µ−. Let σ, σ′ be partial models, i.e. deﬁned only
for some propositional variables. Let σ ⊆ σ′, M(σ′) ∩ µ+(X) = ∅, then
µ−(M(σ′) ∩X) ⊆ µ−(M(σ) ∩X). (We have antitony for µ− in σ.)
Proof. By M(σ′) ⊆ M(σ), M(σ) ∩ µ+(X) = ∅. Thus, by (µ =) for µ+,
M(σ) ∩ µ+(X) = µ+(M(σ) ∩ X), and M(σ′) ∩ µ+(X) = µ+(M(σ′) ∩ X),
424 D.M. Gabbay and K. Schlechta
so by M(σ′) ⊆ M(σ) µ+(M(σ′) ∩ X) ⊆ µ+(M(σ) ∩ X), so by (µ−4)
µ−(M(σ′) ∩X) ⊆ µ−(M(σ) ∩X).
Consider in the following Proposition ν : {M(φ) : φ ∈ F (L)} →DL.
Let µ+(X) := ν(X) ∩X, and µ−(X) := ν(X)−X. (Thus, as ν is deﬁn-
ability preserving, so is µ+.)
Proposition 4.3.
ν : {M(φ) : φ ∈ F (L)} →DL is representable by < and ,
where < is a smooth ranked relation, and  a subrelation of <, and
µ+(X) is the set of < −minimal elements of X, and µ−(X) = {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈
µ+(X).(x  y)},
iﬀ the following conditions hold:
(µ ⊆), (µ∅), (µ =) for µ+, and (µ−1)− (µ−5) for µ+ and µ−.
(Note that we look only at deﬁnablity preserving ν, this is the general
prerequisite. We do not claim that any ν satisfying the µ−conditions is
automatically deﬁnability preserving.)
The rest of this Section is the proof of above Proposition.
4.1. Proof
Set Y := {M(φ) : φ ∈ F (L)}. Note that Y is closed under ﬁnite unions,
ﬁnite intersections, and complementation.
Soundness is easy:
The ﬁrst three hold for smooth ranked structures, and the others are
easily veriﬁed.
We turn to Completeness. For this purpose, we ﬁrst generate the ranked
relation <, and then the subrelation .
4.1.1. The ranked relation <
There is a small problem.
The authors ﬁrst thought that one may take any result for ranked struc-
tures oﬀ the shelf, plug in the other relation somehow (see the second half),
and that’s it. No, that is not suﬃcient, as the following example shows:
Example 4.1. Suppose there is x, and a sequence xi converging to x in the
usual topology. Thus, if x ∈ M(φ), then there will always be some xi in
M(φ), too. Take now a ranked structure Z, where all the xi are strictly
smaller than x, and make some y bigger than x. Consider now any formula
ψ such that x |= ψ, y |= ψ. As inﬁnitely many of the xi will also be models
A Comment on Work by Booth and Co-authors 425
of ψ, x will never be a minimal model of ψ. So we will never be able to
determine that x < y. (If we are allowed to consider full theories, we could
“see” this, of course.) So just considering minimal models will never show
x < y. If, however, we now can also look at models smaller than y, we can
see, under some prerequisites about the order, e.g. deﬁnability preservation,
that x is in this set, so we know that x < y. Thus, we cannot just take
the minimality information, construct the ﬁrst relation, and then look at
what is below, to determine the second relation. We have to take the second
information also to construct the ﬁrst relation. 
Consequently, considering µ− may give strictly more information, and we
have to put in a little more work. We just patch a proof for simple ranked
structures, adding information obtained through µ−.
We follow closely the strategy of the proof of 3.10.11 in [7]. We will,
however, change notation at one point: the relation R in [7] is called  here.
The proof goes over several steps, which we will enumerate.
Note that by Fact 3.1 (page 411), taken from [7], see also [3], (µ ‖), (µ∪),
(µ∪′), (µ =′) hold for µ+, as the prerequisites about the domain are valid.
(1) To generate the ranked relation <, we ﬁrst deﬁne two relations, 1
and 2, where 1 is the usual one for ranked structures, as deﬁned in the
proof of 3.10.11 of [7]. The relation < will be deﬁned in step (4) below.
a 1 b iﬀ a ∈ µ
+(X), b ∈ X for some X, or a = b, and
a 2 b iﬀ a ∈ µ
−(X), b ∈ X for some X.
Finally, we set a  b iﬀ a 1 b or a 2 b.
(2) Obviously,  is reﬂexive, we show that  is transitive by looking at
the four diﬀerent cases.
(2.1) In [7], it was shown that a 1 b 1 c ⇒ a 1 c. For completeness’
sake, we repeat the argument: Suppose a 1 b, b 1 c, let a ∈ µ
+(A), b ∈ A,
b ∈ µ+(B), c ∈ B. We show a ∈ µ+(A ∪ B). By (µ ‖) a ∈ µ+(A ∪ B) or
b ∈ µ+(A ∪ B). Suppose b ∈ µ+(A ∪ B), then µ+(A ∪ B) ∩ A = ∅, so by
(µ =) µ+(A ∪B) ∩A = µ+(A), so a ∈ µ+(A ∪B).
(2.2) Suppose a 1 b 2 c, we show a 1 c : Let c ∈ Y, b ∈ µ
−(Y ) ∩X,
a ∈ µ+(X). Consider X ∪ Y. As X ∩ µ−(Y ) = ∅, by (µ−2) µ+(X ∪ Y ) =
µ+(X), so a ∈ µ+(X ∪ Y ) and c ∈ X ∪ Y, so a 1 c.
(2.3) Suppose a 2 b 2 c, we show a 2 c : Let c ∈ Y, b ∈ µ
−(Y ) ∩X,
a ∈ µ−(X). Consider X ∪ Y. As X ∩ µ−(Y ) = ∅, by (µ−2) µ+(X ∪ Y ) =
µ+(X), so by (µ−4) µ−(X ∪Y ) = µ−(X), so a ∈ µ−(X ∪ Y ) and c ∈ X ∪ Y,
so a 2 c.
(2.4) Suppose a 2 b 1 c, we show a 2 c : Let c ∈ Y, b ∈ µ
+(Y ) ∩X,
a ∈ µ−(X). Consider X ∪ Y. As µ+(Y ) ∩X = ∅, µ+(X) ⊆ µ+(X ∪ Y ).
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(Proof: By (µ ‖), µ+(X ∪ Y ) = µ+(X) ‖ µ+(Y ), so, if µ+(X) ⊆ µ+(X ∪
Y ), then µ+(X)∩µ+(X∪Y ) = ∅, so µ+(X)∩(X∪Y −µ+(X∪Y )) = ∅ by (µ∅),
so by (µ∪′) µ+(X ∪ Y ) = µ+(Y ). But if µ+(Y ) ∩X = µ+(X ∪ Y ) ∩X = ∅,
µ+(X) = µ+(X∪Y )∩X by (µ =), so µ+(X)∩µ+(X∪Y ) = ∅, contradiction.)
So µ−(X) ⊆ µ−(X ∪ Y ) by (µ−4), so c ∈ X ∪ Y, a ∈ µ−(X ∪ Y ), and
a 2 c.
(3) We next prove the following two properties:
(3.1) a ∈ µ+(A), b ∈ A− µ+(A) ⇒ b  a.
(3.2) a ∈ µ−(A), b ∈ A ⇒ b  a.
Proof of (3.1):
(a) Case 1 .
¬(b 1 a) was shown in [7], we repeat again the argument: Suppose
there is B s.t. b ∈ µ+(B), a ∈ B. Then by (µ∪) µ+(A∪B)∩B = ∅, and by
(µ∪′) µ+(A ∪B) = µ+(A), but a ∈ µ+(A) ∩B, contradiction.
(b) Case 2 .
Suppose there is B s.t. a ∈ B, b ∈ µ−(B). But A ∩ µ−(B) = ∅ implies
µ+(A) ∩B = ∅ by (µ−1).
Proof of (3.2):
(a) Case 1 .
Suppose b 1 a, so there is B s.t. a ∈ B, b ∈ µ
+(B), so B ∩ µ−(A) = ∅,
so µ+(B) ∩A = ∅ by (µ−1).
(b) Case 2 .
Suppose b 2 a, so there is B s.t. a ∈ B, b ∈ µ
−(B), so B ∩ µ−(A) = ∅,
so µ−(B) ∩A = ∅ by (µ−3).
(4) Let, by Lemma 3.4 (page 414), S be a total, transitive, reﬂexive
relation on U := ML which extends  s.t. xSy, ySx ⇒ x  y (recall that
 is transitive and reﬂexive). But note that we “lose ignorance” here, as
we make arbitrary decisions. (The authors think that one should keep in
mind that one took such arbitrary decisions. This is, e.g., important to
distinguish the situation of classical completeness, where we consider all
models from, e.g., the situation of general preferential structures, where we
have one universal model. It is good to keep such ﬁne distinctions in mind
- they might become useful one day.) Deﬁne a < b iﬀ aSb, but not bSa. If
a⊥b (i.e. neither a < b nor b < a), then, by totality of S, aSb and bSa.
First, < is ranked: If c < a⊥b, then by transitivity of S cSb, but if bSc,
then again by transitivity of S aSc. Similarly for c > a⊥b.
(5) It remains to show that < represents µ+ and is Y−smooth:
Let a ∈ A − µ+(A). By (µ∅), ∃b ∈ µ+(A), so b 1 a, but by case (3.1)
above a  b, so bSa, but not aSb, so b < a, so a ∈ A−µ<(A). Let a ∈ µ
+(A),
then for all a′ ∈ A a  a′, so aSa′, so there is no a′ ∈ A a′ < a, so a ∈ µ<(A).
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Finally, µ+(A) = ∅, all x ∈ µ+(A) are minimal in A as we just saw, and for
a ∈ A− µ+(A) there is b ∈ µ+(A), b 1 a, so the structure is smooth.
4.1.2. The subrelation 
We now construct the subrelation  and show that  represents µ−.
As this part of the proof is a bit long, and the technique perhaps some-
what unusual, we ﬁrst give a detailed overview. We start with some x ∈
µ−(X). Our task is to ﬁnd suitable y ∈ µ+(X), for which we can deﬁne
x  y. y is a model in a possibly inﬁnite language, so y is described by a
possibly inﬁnite sequence of true/false for each propositional variable. Alter-
natively, y is described by a possibly inﬁnite sequence of pi or ¬pi, i < κ for
some arbitrary, ﬁxed, enumeration of the variables of the language. We will
construct inductively such a sequence of decisions for each variable. As we
can work only with (ﬁnite) formulas, we have access only to ﬁnite fragments
of this sequence. We will see that this suﬃces. During construction, we will
preserve inductively conditions (1) and (2) below, which will assure that the
construction process is possible, and also, in the end, that y has the desired
properties. At some points in the construction, we might choose pi, but also
¬pi, in this case we use an arbitrary model m to determine our strategy.
We turn to the construction of y. We take arbitrary x ∈ µ−(X), and
have to choose suitable y ∈ µ+(X) to make x  y. We ﬁrst have to show
that, if µ−(X) = ∅, then µ+(X) = ∅. (We are indebted to one of the referees
for insisting that this should be shown properly.) If X = ∅, then µ+(X) = ∅
by (µ∅) for µ+. So the only possible case where it might fail is X = ∅.
We have to show that µ−(∅) = ∅. This goes as follows: µ+(∅) = ∅ by
(µ ⊆) for µ+, so µ+(∅) ⊆ µ+(B) for all B, so by (µ−4) µ−(∅) ⊆ µ−(B)
for all B. Take arbitrary Z, and consider (µ−3), setting X := Y := µ−(Z).
Then µ−(Z)∩µ−(µ−(Z)) = ∅ ⇒ µ−(Z)∩µ−(µ−(Z)) = ∅, contradiction, so
µ−(Z) ∩ µ−(µ−(Z)) = ∅. By the above µ−(∅) ⊆ µ−(Z) ∩ µ−(µ−(Z)) = ∅,
and we are done.
The problem — if it is one — is that we can use only finite amounts
of information to ﬁnd such y. y, as a model, is a, possibly inﬁnite, function
τ : v(L) → {t, f}. We construct τ inductively, using finite subsequences
σ ⊆ τ. (The authors consider this technique suﬃciently interesting — it is,
as a matter of fact, the reason why we think this extension of the result
of [2] to the inﬁnite case is publishable.) We do not (just) construct the
ﬁnite subsequences σ mentioned below, but we construct the perhaps very
big sequence τ, of which the σ may be just tiny fragments. The point is that
those fragments suﬃce to construct τ, in a way they assure coherence of τ.
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Suppose we found for x ∈ µ−(X) such y ∈ µ+(X) and made x  y. By
µ+(X) ⊆ X and the deﬁnition of the relation 2 above, we know that x  y.
By (3.2) above, we know that y  x, and by the deﬁnition of the relation <,
we know that x < y, so  is a subrelation of < . (We need not know more
details about the relation  to be constructed now, so we can do this part
of the proof now.)
Take an arbitrary enumeration of the propositional variables of L, pi :
i < κ, κ some (possibly inﬁnite and very big) cardinal. We will inductively
decide for pi or ¬pi. σ etc. will denote a ﬁnite subsequence of the choices
made so far, i.e. σ = ±pi0, . . . ,±pin for some n < ω. (±p will denote here
some choice, either p or ¬p, which we will make inductively.)
Given such σ, M(σ) := M(±pi0)∩ . . .∩M(±pin). σ+σ
′ will be the union
of two such sequences, this is again one such sequence.
Take an arbitrary model m for L, i.e. a function m : v(L) → {t, f}. We
will use this model as a “strategy”, which will tell us how to decide, if we
have some choice.
We determine y by an inductive process, essentially cutting away µ+(X)
around y. We choose pi or ¬pi preserving the following conditions induc-
tively:
For all ﬁnite sequences σ as above we have:
(1) M(σ) ∩ µ+(X) = ∅,
(2) x ∈ µ−(X ∩M(σ)).
For didactic reasons, we do the case p0 separately.
Recall that (µ∅) holds for µ+ by prerequisite. Consider p0. Either
M(p0) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, or M(¬p0) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, or both. (Recall: (µ∅)
holds for µ+, X = ∅, so µ+(X) = ∅, but any element is either in M(p0) or
in M(¬p0).) If e.g. M(p0) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, but M(¬p0) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, then we
have no choice, and we take p0. In the opposite case, we take ¬p0. E.g. in
the ﬁrst case, µ+(X ∩M(p0)) = µ
+(X), so x ∈ µ−(X ∩M(p0)) by (µ
−4).
If both intersections are non-empty, then by (µ−5) x ∈ µ−(X ∩M(p0)) or
x ∈ µ−(X ∩M(¬p0)), or both. Only in the last case, we use our strategy to
decide whether to choose p0 or ¬p0 : if m(p0) = t, we choose p0, if not, we
choose ¬p0. σ(0) will be p0 or ¬p0. Obviously, (1) and (2) above are satisﬁed
for the ﬁnite sequence σ = 〈±p0〉.
Suppose we have chosen pi or ¬pi for all i < α, i.e. deﬁned a partial
function τ from v(L) to {t, f}, and the induction hypotheses (1) and (2) hold
for all ﬁnite σ ⊆ τ. We show now that we can extend τ to τ ′, which chooses
additionally pα or ¬pα, such that all ﬁnite σ ⊆ τ
′ still satisfy conditions
(1) and (2).
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Consider pα, α < κ.
We have to show that we can choose ±pα in a way such that the induction
hypotheses (1) and (2) still hold for all ﬁnite subsequences σ of τ + 〈±pα〉.
The new cases to consider involve the choice of ±pα, of course.
If there is no ﬁnite subsequence σ of the choices done so far s.t. M(σ) ∩
M(pα) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, then pα is a candidate. Likewise for ¬pα.
One of pα or ¬pα is a candidate: Suppose not, then there are σ and σ
′
subsequences of the choices done so far, and M(σ)∩M(pα)∩µ
+(X) = ∅ and
M(σ′) ∩M(¬pα) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅. Consider the ﬁnite subsequence σ + σ′. But
now M(σ+σ′)∩µ+(X) = M(σ)∩M(σ′)∩µ+(X) ⊆M(σ)∩M(pα)∩µ
+(X) ∪
M(σ′)∩M(¬pα)∩µ
+(X) = ∅, contradicting (1) of the induction hypothesis
for σ + σ′. So the induction hypothesis (1) will hold again for all ﬁnite
subsequences σ of τ + 〈±pα〉.
Let σ ⊆ σ′ be two ﬁnite subsequences of τ + 〈pα〉 if pα is a candidate, or
τ + 〈¬pα〉 if ¬pα is a candidate. Thus by (1) M(σ
′)∩µ+(X) = ∅, so by Fact
4.2 (page 423) µ−(M(σ′) ∩X) ⊆ µ−(M(σ) ∩X).
If we have only one candidate left, say e.g. pα, then for each suﬃciently
big sequence σ M(σ) ∩M(¬pα) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅, thus for such σ µ+(M(σ) ∩
M(pα)∩X) = M(σ)∩M(pα)∩µ
+(X) = M(σ)∩µ+(X) = µ+(M(σ)∩X), and
thus by (µ−4) µ−(M(σ)∩M(pα)∩X) = µ
−(M(σ)∩X). So for all suﬃciently
big ﬁnite σ x ∈ µ−(M(σ)∩X) = µ−(M(σ)∩M(pα)∩X) by (2) for σ. But pα
is a candidate, so as we just saw, for any σ′′ ⊆ σ µ−(M(σ) ∩M(pα) ∩X) ⊆
µ−(M(σ′′) ∩M(pα) ∩ X), and x ∈ µ
−(M(σ′′) ∩M(pα) ∩ X) for any ﬁnite
σ′′, so (2) holds again.
Suppose now that we have two candidates, thus for pα and ¬pα and each
σ M(σ) ∩M(pα) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅ and M(σ) ∩M(¬pα) ∩ µ
+(X) = ∅. Thus, as
we just saw, µ−(M(σ′) ∩X) ⊆ µ−(M(σ) ∩X) for σ ⊆ σ′ where σ, σ′ might
involve pα or ¬pα, as both are candidates. By the same kind of argument
as above we see that either for pα or for ¬pα, or for both, and for all ﬁnite
subsequences σ x ∈ µ−(M(σ)∩M(pα)∩X) or x ∈ µ
−(M(σ)∩M(¬pα)∩X).
If not, there are σ and σ′ and x ∈ µ−(M(σ) ∩M(pα) ∩ X) ⊇ µ
−(M(σ +
σ′) ∩M(pα) ∩ X) and x ∈ µ
−(M(σ′) ∩M(¬pα) ∩ X) ⊇ µ
−(M(σ + σ′) ∩
M(¬pα) ∩ X), but µ
−(M(σ + σ′) ∩ X) = µ−(M(σ + σ′) ∩M(pα) ∩ X) ∪
µ−(M(σ +σ′)∩M(¬pα)∩X), so x ∈ µ
−(M(σ+σ′)∩X), contradicting the
induction hypothesis (2).
If we can choose both, we let the strategy decide, as for p0.
So induction hypotheses (1) and (2) will hold again for τ+ < ±pα > .
This inductive procedure ﬁnally gives a complete description of some
model y (relative to the strategy!), and we set x y.
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We now show that  represents µ−.
We have to show: for all Y ∈ Y x ∈ µ−(Y ) ⇔ x ∈ µ(Y ) :⇔ ∃y ∈
µ+(Y ).x y. Recall that x was chosen in µ−(Y ) at the beginning, so x ∈ Y,
and we constructed y with x y, not x for a given y.
“⇒”:
As we will do above construction for all Y, it suﬃces to show that y ∈
µ+(X), we do this now:
If y ∈ µ+(X), then Th(y) is inconsistent with Th(µ+(X)), as µ+ is
deﬁnability preserving, so by classical compactness there is a suitable ﬁnite
sequence σ with M(σ)∩µ+(X) = ∅, but this was excluded by the induction
hypothesis (1). So y ∈ µ+(X).
“⇐”:
Conversely, if the y constructed above is in µ+(Y ), then x has to be in
µ−(Y ), as we show now:
Remember that by construction for this x ∈ µ−(X), y ∈ µ+(Y ).
Suppose y ∈ µ+(Y ), but x ∈ µ−(Y ). So y ∈ µ+(Y ) and y ∈ µ+(X),
and Y = M(φ) for some φ, so there will be a suitable ﬁnite sequence σ s.t.
for all σ′ with σ ⊆ σ′ M(σ′) ∩ X ⊆ M(φ) = Y, and by our construction
x ∈ µ−(M(σ′)∩X) by hypothesis (2). As y ∈ µ+(X)∩µ+(Y )∩ (M(σ′)∩X)
by (µ =) and M(σ′) ∩ X ⊆ Y, µ+(M(σ′) ∩ X) ⊆ µ+(Y ), so by (µ−4)
µ−(M(σ′) ∩X) ⊆ µ−(Y ), so x ∈ µ−(Y ), contradiction.
We do now this construction for all strategies. Obviously, this does not
modify our results.
This ﬁnishes the completeness proof. 
As we postulated deﬁnability preservation, there are no problems to
translate the result into logic. (Note that ν was applied to formula deﬁned
model sets, but the resulting sets were perhaps theory deﬁned model sets.)
4.1.3. Comment
This comment is for readers familiar with [6].
One might try a construction similar to the one for Counterfactual Con-
ditionals, see [6], and try to patch together several ranked structures, one
for each K on the left, to obtain a general distance, by repeating elements.
So we would have diﬀerent “copies” of A, say Ai, more precisely of its
elements, and the natural deﬁnition seems to be: A ∗ φ  ψ iﬀ for all i
Ai ∗ φ  ψ, so A | B =
⋃
{Ai | B : i ∈ I}.
But this does not work: Take A := {a, a′, a′′}, B := {b, b′}, with A |
B := {b, b′}, and a | B = a′ | B = a′′ | B = {b}. Then for all copies of
A Comment on Work by Booth and Co-authors 431
the singletons, the result cannot be empty, but must be {b}. But A | B can
only be a “partial” union of the x | B, x ∈ A, so it must be {b} for all copies
of A, contradiction.
(Alternative deﬁnitions with copies fail too, but no systematic investiga-
tion was done.)
5. Conclusion
Booth et al. have shown that one can do many things in revision with two
relations. They also gave a representation result for the ﬁnite case.
Our contribution is to have given a representation for the interesting
inﬁnite case, where only information about formula deﬁned model sets is
given. To prove our result, we used a - in this context probably novel —
technique, constructing the required models from ﬁnite fragments.
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